Abstract
enhanced by the multiplication of international courts and tribunals.
1 International judges and lawyers are increasingly faced with legal questions relating to the relationship of each specialized regime with its normative environment. In essence, effectively answering these questions constitutes per se a reiteration of the unity of international law. In response to the growing concerns expressed by judges and scholars, the International Law Commission (ILC) appointed a Study Group to address the topic of fragmentation. 2 The Study Group, having limited its analysis to the normative, rather than the institutional, forms of fragmentation, 3 concluded its discussions by producing a voluminous Analytical Report in 2006. The merits of the analysis of the ILC Study Group in terms of codification and systematization of numerous of the pertinent issues involved, capitalizing on the existing scholarly literature on the topic, are hard to disregard. Nevertheless, the 'tool-box' it sought to provide so as to address the normative incongruities and conflicts between distinct international regimes appears to have been largely limited to reiterating largely undisputed international law assumptions, still leaving a number of outstanding issues open; 4 and, importantly, it would appear that in times of frag mentation a unitary account of the international legal system may in fact necessitate more.
It is here that the impetus for the present article, seeking to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate on fragmentation, lies; certain international legal termini technici, though potentially constituting crucial aspects of the fragmentation analytics as unitary elements of the 'system', yet remain largely neglected in international legal literature. Accordingly, in further theorizing the fragmentation phenomenon it is worth assessing the normative underpinnings of the framework proposition that international law is structured and operates as a legal system, hence constituting the normative 'whole' in the sphere of international legal relations (Section 1). Against this background it is equally necessary to dispel the doubts expressed by the ILC Study Group concerning the allegedly obscure meaning and scope of 'general international law' as a terminus 
The Proposition that International Law Constitutes a Legal System
This section, by focusing on the international legal system, does not intend to engage in the debate on whether international law is really law. 5 Nor does it attempt to test the feasibility of international law constituting a legal system by testing it against jurisprudential approaches on the necessary characteristics of legal systems. 6 What it does attempt to assess are the logical and positive-law aspects of the proposition that international law constitutes a legal system proper. Prima facie, this can be understood as a fundamental logical presupposition upon which international lawyers' and judges' legal reasoning is grounded. But, it is here contended that there also exist normative, apart from logical, underpinnings to this proposition.
A The Logical Underpinnings of the Proposition
It cannot but be observed that scholarly reference is often (and casually) made to the 'international legal system' as a self-evident or established fact, dictated by logic and in no need of further justification, possibly motivated by the deeply held belief that the science of international law, targeted at the regulation of international relations, is not a random, chaotic enterprise. 7 'International law is not rules. . . . [i] t is a normative system', goes the much-cited direct formulation of Dame Rosalyn Higgins, insofar as it is the existence of the 'system' that secures a desirable degree of societal order. 8 In the course of scientific endeavour, the underlying belief that each distinct treatment of a particular issue forms part of an overall discourse pertaining to a holistic approach of distinct but interdependent parts of a 'whole' is a result of logic, and indeed secures some kind of order. And, generally, this constitutes often an implicit process, which, as fundamental as it may be, appears to be hardly disputed, in the sense that the presupposition of the international legal system constitutes a narrative essentially logical for international lawyers.
International law has thus been defined as 'a system of law designed primarily for the external relations of states [which] does not work like any internal legal system of a state'; 9 a 'voluntary and cooptative system', which, in contrast to domestic legal systems, is 'horizontal because international society is a voluntary association of states with no superior authority to make law, pronounce judgment and otherwise enforce the law with binding effect, except through institutions which states have, by consent established'.
10 'In brief', as Shabtai Rosenne put it, 'international law is a comprehensive and sophisticated legal system that, despite its voluntarist basis, operates exclusively in the international political environment where the principal actors are sovereign independent States'. 11 It is in this vein that the idea that international law is a 'system' has been characterized as 'almost axiomatic', insofar as 'it is hard not to think about international law in a way that doesn't invoke some idea of structure or system '. 12 It is perhaps useful to observe at this early point that the terms 'international legal system' and 'international legal order' often feature in public international law theory as almost synonymous. 13 Ergo, and while, as will be demonstrated infra, the judgments and decisions of international courts feature references to the 'international See, e.g., the use of the two terms in the insightful analysis on the structure of the international legal system provided in Zemanek, 'The Legal Foundations of the International System: General Course on Public International Law', 266 RdC (1997) 9, at 29-42. legal system', 14 one could equally trace references to the 'international legal order', the two terms deployed lacking an inter se distinction or differentiation. For instance, the Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Gulf of Maine Case referred to 'rules of law, in the international legal order, which govern the matter at issue'. 15 What is more, in the context of recent arbitral practice relating to investment protection tribunals often note the distinction between national legal orders and the international legal order, 16 including references to 'rights as resulting, within the international legal order from two international treaties', 17 or statements such as that '[a]s a matter of general principle, the same set of facts can give rise to different claims grounded on differing legal orders: the municipal and the international legal orders '. 18 Notwithstanding that it is not here intended to enter the realm of legal philosophy, 19 it can be observed that the two terms are intimately intertwined, though not synonymous in the strict sense. While 'international legal system' refers to the existence of a body of legal rules structured as a 'system', the concept of a 'legal order' ('ordre/ordonnement juridique') as such entails and presupposes the existence of further elements, such as a social base (in acceptance of the maxim 'ubi societas ibi jus' -'where there is society there is law'), legal subjects, and certain basic, even if decentralized, functions. Ergo, and per Paul Reuter, a legal order comprises a body of rules 'mises en ordre', of varying degrees of completeness and effectiveness, being more of an effort rather than a point of departure. 20 Bin Cheng has similarly defined the 'international legal order' as 'the structure which results from the existence and operation of the international legal system', 21 while Pierre-Marie Dupuy has further explained that '[a] "legal order" may be defined as a system of norms binding on determined subjects which trigger some pre-established consequences when the subjects breach their obligations', then to conclude that 'the existence of the international legal order should not be challenged'. 22 In any event, the crux of the matter seems to be that, 14 See infra nn 37-47, and accompanying text. 24 To what extent there exist normative, apart from logical, underpinnings to this proposition is analysed in the next section of this study.
B The Legal Underpinnings of the Proposition
In search of the possible legal underpinnings of the narrative of international law as a 'system', it is necessary to turn to the formal sources of international law, as enshrined in Article 38(1) paragraphs (a) to (c) of the ICJ Statute. 25 The question here, then, is whether the proposition that international law is structured and operates as a normative system per se satisfies the 'positive law tests ' 
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For the sake of consistency, and in view of the normative approach followed in the present enquiry, the term 'international legal system' is to be utilized hereinafter. The option of Art. 38(1)(a) ICJ Statute is not to be explored further, insofar as it is rather unlikely for the proposition that international law constitutes a legal system to ever take the form of a treaty proviso. Moreover, qualifying the systemic proposition of international law as a general principle of law applied in foro domestico of para.
(1)(c)can be potentially based, albeit indirectly, on the monist or dualist perceptions prevalent in the various domestic legal systems premised upon the ab initio distinction between the national and international normative realms (on monism and dualism: see, e. It has been observed that the reference to 'systematization of rules of international law' in Article 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission (adopted and subsequently amended via General Assembly resolutions) signifies 'their conceptualization within the embrace of a singular code'. 29 In this respect, it can be recalled that 'resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly may in some instances constitute evidence of the existence of customary international law; help to crystallize emerging customary law; or contribute to the formation of new customary law'. 30 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the above observation was in fact intended to imply that there exists unanimous state practice treating international law as a legal system, as a practice expressive of law. Interestingly, Christian Dominicé has written that, in no need of a theoretical foundation, based solely on a 'mere observation of reality' and the maxim ubi societas ibi jus, the conclusion that international law exists as a legal system 'is buttressed by the finding that there is a sort of collective opinio juris, a conviction that international law exists and that States could not do without it'. 31 While indeed that author proceeds from a descriptive rather than a normative outlook, one would be tempted to proceed further and examine whether there exists any state practice to be coupled with the opinio juris Dominicé mentions, so as to argue in favour of the existence of a customary rule regarding the systemic character of international law. ' Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations', 51 AJIL (1957) 734, at 748-749; similarly, Sørensen, 'Principes de droit international public: cours général', 101 RdC (1960) 1, at 22-26), it would still not be unfeasible further to suggest that the contention that law, both domestic and international, is structured and operates systemically constitutes a general principle applicable to all kinds of legal relations, especially considering the frequent mention made of 'legal system/order', 'code', 'codification' etc in legal literature in general. E.g., see a common dictionary definition of 'law': '[t] he body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects. (In this sense usually the law.) Also, in early use, a code or system of rules of this kind' (emphasis added): Oxford Online Dictionary (www.oed.com). So, while the ICJ, for example, has never directly addressed why and how international law is structured and normatively operates as a 'system', one can trace instances where the term 'international legal system' or related terms have been utilized in passim by the Court. 37 In the Reparations case the Court stated that 'the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community'.
38 Also, while in the Namibia Advisory Opinion the Court stated that 'an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation', 39 later in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case it stated in passim: '[i]t is one thing to seek to determine whether a concept is known to a system of law, in this case international law'. 40 Combining the above with the parallel usage by the Court in its judgments and advisory opinions of terms such as 'legal system of the United Nations', 41 'system of the (ICJ) Statute', 42 'system of consular protection', 43 'general system of minority protection', 44 and, most notably, 'self-contained regime', 45 it appears that the existence of the system of international law as a whole is judicially acknowledged via the recognition of certain of its systemic differentiations, i.e., the parallel identification of sub-systems operating in its ambit. Moreover, references to the international legal system have also been made by other international courts and tribunals. 46 The OSPAR Arbitration could be seen as a prominent 37 The references by international judicial bodies to the system of international law can be considered as falling into the category of Art. 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, as 'subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law': in this respect see, e.g., Roucounas, 'Rapport entre "moyens auxiliaires" de détermination du droit international', in: K. Koufa (ed. The above is not to be read as implying the existence of a comprehensive and detailed agreed view of the international legal system among states, adjudicators, or scholars. Agreement on the systemic nature of international law appears to have been achieved solely on the basis that the proposition still remains an elementary one. Certain questions regarding the more intimate attributes of the 'system' and, most prominently, its unity indeed remain unaddressed.
And this last point is crucial for a question that arises as a continuation of the analysis so far: is the proposition according to which international law is structured and operates as a 'system' capable of and/or suitable, in the first place, for constituting a customary norm? The formulation of the ILA on the formation of international customary law again appears pertinent: a customary norm must, inter alia, relate to state practice not situated 'outside the sphere of international legal relations' so that states are unable to claim specific performance as a matter of legal right. 48 In effect, this is expressive of the fact that only international legal norms establishing rights and obligations can be invoked in the context of international adjudication. 49 Hence, it must be further substantiated that per se the proposition of the international legal system lies 'inside the sphere of international legal relations', or, in other words, forms (or can form) part of the legal argument employed before international courts and tribunals.
Nevertheless, the previous tracing of the logical and legal contours of the proposition that international law is structured as a 'system', in terms similar to a deductive analytical approach, 50 appears to have reached its limits. In Koskenniemi's words, '[i]t is often said that law is a "system". By this no more need be meant than that the various decisions, rules, and principles of which the law consists do not appear 
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ILA Report on Custom, supra note 30, at 745-746, excluding acts of interstate comity, for example. This conclusion potentially applies mutatis mutandis in the case of the emergence of general principles of law as unwritten international law. 49 Unless the parties to the dispute agree that the case is decided ex aequo et bono, as, e.g., under Art. 38 (2) of the ICJ Statute. 51 Accordingly, while the prevalent belief that international law exists as a legal 'system' appears reiterated, the proposition is of such generic and elementary character and remains at such a level of abstraction that answering the question whether it can be situated per se 'inside the sphere of international legal relations' appears obscure.
That said, a shift of analytical approach is hereby suggested in order to situate the proposition of the systemic character of international law within the sphere of international legal relations: more specifically, it is apt to consider in the next two sections of this study the potential contribution of two normative differentiations to the international legal system (the 'whole'), which, independently identified in international juridical reasoning, lend normativity to the proposition that international law constitutes a legal system, in terms, now, of a 'bottom-up' (inductive) analytical approach. Opting now for inductive legal reasoning, 52 the discussion will turn to the 'general/ particular' international law distinction as a normative scope-type differentiation from the 'whole' (the 'whole' comprising both general international law norms and particular international law norms), and the 'primary/secondary norms' distinction as a normative function-type differentiation from the 'whole' (the 'whole' comprising both 'primary' and 'secondary' norms). These differentiations, each denoting a specific sub-set of the totality of international rules, play a significant role in international adjudication, being situated in the core of legal argument before the various courts and tribunals often facing the legal challenges set by the normative fragmentation of international law. As will be demonstrated infra, they stand in their own name in the course of dispute settlement directly influencing the judicial acknowledgement of legal rights and obligations in the sphere of international dispute settlement. It is specifically in this vein that the existence of the above differentiations, pertaining to the scope and function of international legal norms, necessarily imply and are expressive, by virtue of the specific sub-sets of rules they denote, signify, and represent, of the parallel existence of the international legal system as the overarching normative structure. Cf Schwarzenberger, 'The Inductive Approach to International Law', 60 Harvard L Rev (1947) 539, at 568: '[a[n international lawyer who applies the inductive method in full awareness of the hierarchies of sources, law-determining agencies, and elements of such agencies will always have at his disposal reliable measuring rods for determining the significance of instances taken from state practice, of individual decisions of international and national courts, and of the writings of the most highly qualified publicists'. It has been insightfully observed that the qualification of international law as 'general' vis-à-vis 'special' treaty regimes has been resorted to as means of concealing the true character of general international law as 'residual', 54 that is, applicable by default unless explicitly derogated from by (special) treaty language. Indeed, and as one can infer from the ICJ's ruling in the South-West Africa Cases (Second Phase), the normative effect of the residual/default applicability of a given international norm is such that the norm in question can 'operate per se to give rise to legal rights and obligations' which potentially expand to the sphere of inter partes international legal relations, i.e., subject matter specific regimes. 55 It is in a similar fashion that the Eureko v. Slovak Republic investment Tribunal noted that 'the perspective of [a given international court or tribunal] must begin with the instrument by which and the legal order within which consent [to its prima facie jurisdiction] originated'; 56 differently put, the proper legal framework for adjudicating a given international legal dispute comprises the treaty in casu as well as other rules of international law inter partes or erga omnes (by default) binding. For, notwithstanding their specificities, all specialized regimes 'are founded on, and connected with, general international law, and many disputes arising in their context can be settled only by reverting to rules of that law', 57 insofar as, to recall Pierre-Marie Dupuy's eloquent metaphor, all allegedly autonomous regimes 'speak a language in which the common grammar is international law'. In fact, the case law of international courts and tribunals fully supports the proposition of residual applicability of general international law norms; or, as stated in Micula and ors v. Romania, '[investment tribunals, in their capacity as international courts] will certainly apply residually international law if the other applicable rules are silent or obscure or are eventually determined not to apply ratione temporis'. 59 Hence, the Camuzzi v. Argentina Tribunal referred to the customary rules of diplomatic protection as a 'residual mechanism' for the redress of injuries to individuals which is operative in the lack of leges speciales established by means of bilateral or multilateral treaties or other agreements. 60 It is in the same respect that the SG v. Dominican Republic Tribunal similarly noted that, '[t]he rules governing issues not addressed by the specific language of the treaty may sometimes be provided by the law of diplomatic protection, which apply as customary international law, and thus, provides for a residual role for at least some aspects of the law of diplomatic protection'. 61 Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) also offers references to the residual application of (general) international humanitarian law, and particularly in the context of Articles 3 and 5(i) of its Statute 62 as 'residual clauses' designed so that no violation of the customary laws of war escapes the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 63 Ergo, the law of treaties constitutes a prime example of the residual applicability and application of norms identified as derived from general international law. 64 The VCLT, as observed by Sir Arthur Watts, authoritatively sets out the modern customary law on treaties, 65 while there has been no occasion as yet where the ICJ has addressed the application of its provisions, and has not verified their customary status. 66 So to the extent to which the majority of the VCLT provisions reflect custom, one can conclude that the norms of the law of treaties apply residually, that is, 'automatically, and without incorporation', 67 insofar as that they have not been explicitly derogated from by specific treaty provisions. 68 Moreover, as is the case with the residual applicability of the customary law on treaties, the application of the 'general residual law' 69 on state responsibility is premised and dependent upon the lack of specific derogation by states in their inter se legal relations. The ILC Responsibility Articles 'being general in character, . 73 Ergo, the same stance (i.e., default applicability of the ILC Responsibility Articles in the absence of a specific treaty stipulation to that effect) is consistently taken by investment arbitration tribunals. 74 In the context of WTO adjudication, and among other instances where the default applicability of general international law in WTO disputes has been acknowledged, 75 the Arbitrator in the US -'Upland Cotton' Article 4.11 and 7.10 SCM arbitrations authoritatively cited the ILC commentaries on countermeasures and acknowledged the residual applicability of the ILC Responsibility Articles in so far as they 'do not purport to prevail over any specific provisions relating to the areas it covers that would be contained in specific legal instruments'. 76 In addition, the Arbitral Tribunal established by the second Canada/US Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) of 2006 in order to resolve the long-standing trade dispute between the parties also acknowledged the default applicability of the Chorzów Factory principle 77 enshrined in Article 31 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, explaining that since 'there is no necessity for this principle to be stated in the applicable treaty itself. . . [its] applicability . . . . for the SLA, therefore, must be accepted unless further examination leads to a different conclusion', i.e., that a lex specialis provision exists in that agreement. 78 That said, it is evident that general international law can play a central role in international adjudication currently hampered by the normative fragmentation of international law; for, as verified in the Report of the ILC Study Group, fragmentation takes place 'against the background' of general international law. 79 Nevertheless, the normative characteristics of this 'background' operation still remain obscure; perhaps this obscurity is further fuelled by the inconsistent and occasionally confusing stance adopted by the Study Group insofar as the content and scope of the term 'general international law' are concerned. More specifically, while the Study Group employed the term 'general international law' to denote customary rules and general principles of law, there are instances in its analysis where equal mention of general international law is made by reference to environmental or human rights treaties. 80 Moreover, in the last pages of the Analytical Report, while general international law is defined as encompassing custom and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, it is nevertheless confusingly stated that 'it might also refer to principles of international law proper and to analogies from domestic laws, especially principles of the legal process (audiatur et altera pars, in dubio mitius, estoppel and so on) ' . 81 It was perhaps in realization of the above inconsistencies that an 'examination of the notion of general international law' was deferred by the Study Group to future ILC studies in order to determine what sources are covered by the term, as well as its relationship with treaty-making; 82 hence, it is most probably the prior invocation of the concept of 'principles of international law proper' by the Study Group that cast doubts over the content and meaning of the term 'general international law'. It is worth, then, investigating what these 'principles of international law proper', allegedly a potential normative response to the fragmentation phenomenon, may actually mean, given the importance attributed to them by the ILC Study Group. In this respect, it is useful to revisit briefly the concept of general principles in international law. One could recall that whether Article 38(1) (c) ICJ Statute includes both 'general principle of law recognized by civilized nations' and 'general principles of international law' has been subject to scholarly debate. 83 While certain international lawyers have taken the view that both are in fact included in paragraph 1(c), the, perhaps dominant, restrictive approach envisages that paragraph as including solely those general principles derived from domestic law, while 'general principles of international law' are rather derived from or associated with or reflected in custom and multilateral treaty law. 84 For example, according to the American Law Institute, 'references to "general principles of international law" ordinarily mean principles accepted as customary international law whether or not they derive from principles common to national legal systems'. 91 In fact, that was also the use of the term made by the PCIJ in the Danzig Advisory Opinion, 92 more recently confirmed by the WTO panel in EC -Biotech, holding that 'the term "general principle of international law". . . may be understood as encompassing either rules of customary law or the recognized general principles of law or both'. 93 It then indeed appears to a large extent settled that references to 85 See, e.g., ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 2, at para. 462. It is in this sense that the Study Group's reference to 'principles of international law proper' can only prove to be circular; for, insofar as the Study Group itself explicitly distinguished 'principles of international law proper' from custom and general principles of law, the allegedly novel concept which it sought to introduce into the fragmentation discourse can only be viewed as a plain reiteration of the omnipresence and continuous relevance of general international law (i.e., customary rules and general principles of law) in tackling the negative challenges set by fragmentation. Nevertheless, the Study Group itself also declined to define what 'general international law' means and deferred its examination for future ILC works. It is in view of the above that the position taken in the present study is at odds with the one expressed by the ILC Study Group suggesting the allegedly obscure, and in need of further elaboration, content of the term 'general international law', and the independent existence of 'principles of international law proper'. As will be demonstrated infra, the term 'general international law', denoting a normative scope-type differentiation from the international legal system, has long been delimited in international legal theory and judicial practice, and it is exactly in its normative ambit that possible solutions to the challenges set by the fragmentation phenomenon could be sought by virtue of the default applicability of international legal norms binding erga omnes.
B A Normative Scope-Type Differentiation in Fact Delimited
The term 'general international law' has been characterized as endowed with a 'certain degree of imprecision', 95 even though it often features in international instruments. 96 Hence, it has been suggested that references in treaties to 'international law' are in practice equated with references to 'general international law', still without further elaboration. 97 Nevertheless, one can be reminded that Bin Cheng has defined 'general international law' from a normative scope-type perspective, i.e., as the set of norms 'the legal effect of which are erga omnes', and distinguished it from the 'international legal system' which, in turn, constitutes the entire set of international norms 'whether binding on all (erga omnes), or only between some (inter partes or inter se)'. Similarly, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice viewed treaties merely as a 'sources of obligation' rather than 'sources of law', sources being reserved to general custom and fundamental general principles of law as opposable erga omnes.
98 A more recent view by Buzzini has also identified an aspect of 'extrinsic generality' in general international law as 'objective law' imposed upon the entirety of states.
99 It then appears that this understanding has prevailed to the extent that 'general international law' is now indeed generally taken to refer to international norms binding erga omnes, contrary to treaty (or other) norms binding inter partes. 100 In this context, the erga omnes binding force of a given norm should not be confused with the concept of obligations erga omnes, i.e., legal obligations owed to the international community as a whole. For the concept of obligations erga omnes relates to jus standi (who has standing to invoke responsibility), while erga omnes binding force refers to the scope of addressees of the norm (vis-à-vis whom can the norm be invoked against). 101 Otherwise put, general international law refers to norms which are 'binding on and, in principle, applicable to all the subjects of the international legal system'.
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International judicial practice reaffirms the above position. For example, in the ELSI Case, the Chamber of the ICJ interpreted the reference to 'international law' in a treaty provision as referring to general international law. 103 , at 2-3. While both Bin Cheng and Oppenheim would agree that, in their analyses, international legal system and universal international law are more or less conterminous, they would still disagree on the connotation of general international law; in other words, whether the term connotes norms binding on all (erga omnes), or only between some (inter partes or inter se). Bin Cheng appeared more flexible in one of his earlier writings, where he suggests that, first, often general international law is taken to refer to the international legal system as a whole, and, secondly, that according to the ICJ jurisprudence there exists a wider meaning and a narrower sense of general international law, the first comprising both custom and general principles, and the latter custom solely. In any case, he still did not endorse Oppenheim's distinction (Bin Cheng, supra note 10, at 526). international law features greatly in the Court's treatment of issues on state responsibility. Hence, 'the obligation of a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act to put an end to that act is well established in general international law'; 104 also, 'it is well established in general international law that a State which bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act'. 105 In the more recent Application of the Genocide Convention Case the Court juxtaposed the Convention with other legal norms on interpretation and responsibility which were derived from general international law. 106 Overall, it can be safely deduced that the ICJ resorts to the use of the term 'general international law' in order to denote norms binding erga omnes, contrary to treaty (or other) norms binding inter partes. 107 At this point, confusion could possibly arise so as to create the impression that general international law and customary international law constitute but one and the same normative concept, possibly fuelled by statements like 'in accordance with the rules of general international law on the point as codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'. 108 But this assumption would be erroneous, given that the ICJ used both terms in the Nicaragua case in a way that leaves little doubt as to their distinct bearing. 109 In addition to that, one can further identify a parallel tendency in international adjudication to refer to 'general customary international law', 110 often interchangeably with customary international law. 111 Or, as recalled by Tunkin from the days of his ILC membership, 'the Commission never used the terms "general international law" and "customary international law" as synonymous'. 112 It then appears that general international law indeed includes (general) customary law inter alia, but not exclusively. 113 Hence, the ILA has stated that general international law, defined as the law that applies to all states, is not limited to general custom but may possibly include other forms of unwritten law such as 'fundamental' or 'constitutional' principles of international law. 114 The relationship between legal rules and principles has been characterized 'as no more than the use of a dual expression to convey one and the same idea . . . the term "principles" . . . justified because of their more general and more fundamental character'. 115 Prima facie, then, general international law also includes general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, general principles inherent in all kinds of legal relations, as well as general principles of international law. 116 The reasoning of the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Concessions Case unequivocally recognized the erga omnes binding force of general principles as general law. 117 The ICJ in the Right of Passage Case later reaffirmed this when juxtaposing local custom on the one hand, and 'general international custom or the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations' on the other.
118 This is further reinforced by the Court's remark in the Barcelona Traction case concerning the 'rights of protection [from slavery and racial discrimination which] have entered into the body of general international law', 119 also citing a passage from the Reservations Advisory Opinion stating that 'principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation'. 120 In any case, it would be problematic otherwise to understand dicta, such as those provided by the ICJ in the Nottebohm Case 121 or the Namibia Advisory Opinion 122 without accepting that 'general international law' as a term includes also paragraph (c) of Article 38(1) ICJ Statute. 123 And this was in essence the position also taken by the ICSID-constituted Tribunal in the Waguih Elie, George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. Egypt investment dispute. 124 In sum, then, it would seem that, contrary to the view expressed by the ILC Study Group on fragmentation, the normative concept of 'general international law' is in fact delimited, comprising customary rules and general principles of law. As a result, it is not clear what the Study Group intended when suggesting that there is a need for future ILC studies to address the concept of 'general international law'. On the one hand, the Study Group's attempt to introduce the concept of 'principles of international law proper' in the fragmentation discourse constitutes, as mentioned earlier, merely a renvoi to general international law norms, so that a future ILC study along those lines would eventually lead to a vicious circle, simply reiterating the (otherwise uncontested) pertinence of general law in the fragmentation discourse. On the other, if the Study Group envisaged a future ILC study pertaining to the codification of the entirety of general international law norms, so as, circuitously again, to respond to the normative challenges of fragmentation, this suggestion would be over-ambitious, if not unrealistic.
But, perhaps more importantly, what the Study Group only limitedly, if at all, highlighted was the normative weight to be attributed to the qualification of a given norm as belonging to the corpus of general international law. It is exactly this omission that The Court cannot dismiss the claim of Nicaragua under principles of customary and general international law simply because such principles have been enshrined in the texts of the conventions relied on by Nicaragua. The fact that the above-mentioned principles, recognized as such, have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries that are parties to such conventions. . . . Therefore, since the claim before the Court in this case is not confined to violation of the multilateral convention provisions invoked, it would not in any event be barred by the multilateral treaty reservation in the United States 1946 Declaration.
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As observed by Dame Rosalyn Higgins, '[i]t was important for the Court in that case, because of jurisdictional difficulties it faced in dealing with the UN Charter as a treaty-based applicable law, to find a parallel customary international law'. 126 In the merits phase, the Court was even more explicit and elaborated on the default application of customary rules vis-à-vis treaty law, by virtue of the former's classification as part of general international law. For even the UN Charter, as a multilateral treaty proper, does not pose an exception respectively, insofar as this treaty [the Charter] itself refers to pre-existing customary international law [on the right to self defence]. . . Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. . . . . It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which "subsumes and supervenes" customary international law. It rather demonstrates that in the field in question, . . . customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content. This could also be demonstrated for other subjects, in particular for the principle of non-intervention.
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Differently put, in the Nicaragua Case 'general international law' as a normative term per se generated juridical consequences in the course of international judicial process by expanding the available applicable law to the disputed claims outside the realm of particular international law (i.e., treaties). Via this route, the norms per se that belong to general international law (in the Nicaragua Case, the prohibition of use of force and principle of non-intervention) were qualified as within the Court's competence, and thus can be taken into consideration to generate in turn their own juridical consequences (in other words, they are residually applicable).
As a result of the above analysis, it appears that the general/particular international law differentiation signifies a specific normative perspective, i.e., the scope of international norms as binding erga omnes or erga omnes partes. The term 'general international law' vis-à-vis each specific norm it encompasses operates similarly to but still somewhat differently from terms such as 'customary law', 'treaty law', and 'general principles of law': the difference lies in the fact that general international law rather signifies a different level of normative enquiry (that is, normative scope as binding erga omnes), while the last three terms originally refer to sources of international law (that is, how law is created). In this way, the existence of 'general international law' as a normative scope-type sub-differentiation denoting only those norms which are binding erga omnes logically and normatively adheres to the international legal system (the normative 'whole'); for admitting the existence of a category of norms binding on all logically and normatively presupposes and inclines to admit the parallel existence of other norms binding on some, both categories envisaged against the framework of the international legal system as the normative 'whole' (that is international norms binding erga omnes or erga omnes partes).
'Primary' and 'Secondary' Rules in the International Legal System as a Normative Function-Type Differentiation A A Normative Function-Type Differentiation Delimited
It is striking that only sporadically has the fragmentation debate addressed the crucial, as it is herein submitted, normative function-type differentiation pertinent for the fragmentation analysis, namely, the distinction between primary and secondary norms long known in the context of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. In international legal scholarship, 'primary' and 'secondary' norms were first substantially utilized by the ILC in its work on state responsibility in 1970, secondary norms being the ones eventually considered for the purposes of the codification of the law on state responsibility, that being 'l'épicentre d'un système juridique'. 128 Primary norms are those 'which in one sector of inter-State relations or another, impose particular obligations on States', while secondary norms are those that are 'concerned with determining the consequences of failure to fulfill obligations established by the primary rules'. 129 Insofar as the 'formal unity' of international law is in fact composed of secondary rules, 130 the 'primary'/'secondary' norm distinction denotes the existence of a normative function-type differentiation from the system as a 'whole', categorizing international rules according to their normative operation in the context of state responsibility analysis. It is true that the ILC's distinction between primary and secondary norms may prima facie appear, to a large extent, to be influenced by H.L.A.
Hart's Concept of Law;
131 nevertheless, Hartian thought should not be considered as the origin of the distinction, especially given Hart's broader definition of secondary norms, 132 as well as his reluctance to consider international law except as a 'simple the 'move to a set of articles dealing solely with secondary obligations associated with breach was a step in the direction of profitable generalization' 143 was expressive of Ago's decision to opt for the codification of a general regime of responsibility, residually applicable irrespective of the international legal rule infringed, i.e., approaching the topic of state responsibility 'lato sensu', 144 as opposed to the previous approach focusing on responsibility for injuries to aliens taken by the first Special Rapporteur, Garcia Amador. The distinction between primary and secondary rules for the analytical purposes of state responsibility signalled the ILC's choice to deal solely with secondary norms as general law. No prominent role was reserved for an indispensable part of Hart's theory, that is, the 'rule of recognition', as it would possibly touch upon the already debated topic of sources of international law; 145 rather, the primary/ secondary differentiation remained at a certain level of abstraction, designed solely as a methodological vehicle so as to avoid taking a 'circuitous route' for determining the duties imposed by international law on states regarding the treatment of aliens in the context of codifying the law on state responsibility. 146 Hence, following Ago's endorsement of the primary/secondary norm distinction, later studies by the ILC have also featured and utilized this international legal terminus technicus, again in order to delimit the scope and content of the analysis undertaken, i.e., whether the codification and/or development enterprise related to the specific international legal rules establishing primary obligations or the secondary rules dealing with the breach of subject-specific primary ones. For instance, the commentary to Article 27 of the 1978 ILC 'Draft Articles on most favoured-nation clauses' referred to and relied on the distinction so as to clarify that the consequences of their breach (as 'primary rules') were not dealt with therein and were rather governed by the secondary rules on state responsibility. 147 Moreover, the primary/secondary norm distinction was characterized as an 'analytic device' in the context of the ILC works on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, 148 151 What is important here is that the text per se of Article 3 of the Declaration ('Applicable law') explicitly features and incorporates the primary/secondary norm terminology in order to clarify that the Declaration is limited to secondary rules. 152 The direct reference to the distinction between primary and secondary rules is striking, especially considering that, until then, only in ILC commentaries rather than ILC instruments as such was the distinction highlighted. Ergo, and endorsing in full Ago's 'analytical device', the commentary to Article 3 of the Declaration justified this choice by remarking that '[t]he distinction between primary and secondary rules is well established in the law of state responsibility', 153 while one could further observe that the ILA Committee in any event remained cautious so as not 'to blur the distinction between primary and secondary obligations'. 154 It is then perhaps in the above spirit that various comments and observations by governments in the context of ILC works again reveal that states are not hesitant to refer to, and often explicitly endorse, the distinction between primary and secondary rules. 155 Moreover, states, as parties to international disputes, have at the same time utilized the ILC's 'analytic device' in their claims and submissions before international courts and tribunals, so that, for instance, the legal arguments advanced by both the United Kingdom and France in the more recent Eurotunnel Arbitration operated and were designed upon the primary/secondary distinction. 156 As will be further developed in the next section, the main reasons for this relates to the role of the distinction in the context of the proper application of the lex specialis principle in the settlement of international disputes, lying at the core of the contemporary fragmentation analysis.
B A Normative Function-Type Differentiation Pertinent to the Proper Operation of Lex Specialis
It is worth noting at this point that certain authors have recently taken a negative stance towards the substantial utility of distinguishing between primary and secondary norms in modern international legal analysis. 157 Given that the concept of 'self-contained regimes' is in fact designed to denote 'those subsystems that embrace a full, exhaustive and definitive, set of secondary rules ', 158 reference to the distinction is usually made only as a descriptive, factual element the analytical merits and normative consequences of which remain unaddressed. In the same fashion, while the ILC Study Group dedicated a substantial portion of its analysis to lex specialis, when it came to elaborate on the crucial aspects underlying specialty of subject-matter, so that a given ('special') norm prevails over another ('general' one), no reference was made to the different functions served by primary and secondary rules as a decisive element for the operation of lex specialis, and it was simply recalled that 'the criterion of the "same subject-matter" as a condition for applying a conflict rule is too unspecific to be useful'. 159 It is exactly in this respect that the unitary character of the primary/ secondary function-type differentiation gains significance by providing normative solutions in cases of genuine conflicts between rules of general and particular international law, 160 which prima facie challenge the unity and coherence of the international legal system; for it is exactly the differing normative function of primary and secondary rules that prevents them from qualifying as relating to the 'same subject-matter'.
Although the ICJ in its decisions, orders, and advisory opinions has so far refrained from explicitly using the primary/secondary norm terminology, it has nevertheless implicitly confirmed the importance of the distinction in terms of the proper operation of lex specialis in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, where general international law was juxtaposed to the 1977 Treaty constituting particular international law (lex specialis). 161 Also, later in the Application of the Genocide Convention case the ICJ observed in a more explicit fashion that '[t]he [secondary] rules for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in question in the absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis', i.e., a particular secondary rule. 162 To use the formulation of the F-W Oil Interests investment Tribunal: the substantive standards against which the Claimant puts forward its claims are those laid down in a specific treaty, not general international law, immediately opens up the possibility that particular standards of attributability may apply, as lex specialis, in substitute for or supplementation of the general rules of State responsibility -a possibility to which the ILC draws attention repeatedly in its draft Articles and the Commentaries (notably Article 55 & Commentary). Even if not (ie, even if the applicable secondary rules of State responsibility remain unaffected), the fact that the treaty is a BIT opens up a further possibility at the level of primary obligation, specifically that the broad scope mutually agreed by the Contracting Parties for encouraging as well as protecting the investments of one in the territory of the other may have the effect of requiring (sc. As a matter of treaty obligation) the Government to adopt patterns of conduct in respect of its State organs and para-statal entities different from those that would ordinarily be required under general international law or treaty law. 163 Equally, in a later award the United Parcel Service of America Inc v. Canada Tribunal also acknowledged the prevalence of the various provisions of Chapter Fifteen NAFTA dealing with monopolies and state enterprises over ILC Articles 4 and 5 on the conduct of state organs and monopolies. 164 In the above cases, the arbitral tribunals verified the applicability, in principle, of customary secondary norms on state responsibility by making explicit reference to the primary/secondary norm distinction, hence demonstrating that the operation of lex specialis necessitates the juxtaposition of two primary or two secondary norms. Still, one would note that the primary/secondary norm distinction is potentially difficult to draw.
Indeed, and notwithstanding that the distinction has not given rise to particular problems in actual (i.e., judicial) international practice, 165 the formulation of primary and secondary norms the ILC opted for has occasionally met with doctrinal criticism, mainly on the ground that certain secondary norms can also be conceived as primary ones. 166 The rules on attribution of internationally unlawful acts found in Articles 4 to 11 have been identified as a pertinent example of internal overlap in the context of the primary/secondary norm differentiation. 167 It is here perhaps that the abovementioned passage from F-W Oil Interests Inc v. Trinidad and Tobago proves to be of added value: The last Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, in his Third Report on State Responsibility hinted that, as a result of the primary/secondary norm distinction, the secondary norms contained in the ILC Articles can be 'qualified by the relevant primary rule, or by a secondary lex specialis'. 168 In other words, a given treaty may derogate from the customary secondary norms on state responsibility either by incorporating the ILC standard in one of the provisions (primary norms) it contains, or by being itself equipped with a special provision operating as a secondary norm. It appears that this is the possibility alluded to in F-W Oil Interests: according to one scenario, the ILC Articles are displaced by virtue of the lex specialis derogat legi generali doctrine by those provisions of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in question which operate as secondary norms; 169 according to a second scenario, it is 'at the level of primary obligation', and thus escaping the operative scope of lex specialis, that standards different from those found in the ILC Articles are established via the conclusion of treaties. 170 For it was often explicitly and implicitly made clear that the default operation of the ILC Articles, notwithstanding the operation of lex specialis, was above all subordinated to the normative content and scope of the primary rule the breach of which they sought to address in the first place. Overall, the identification of a norm as primary or secondary crucial in terms of the proper operation of lex specialis appears by now reiterated in international adjudication. 171 That said, one cannot ignore the fact that the distinction between primary and secondary norms for the purposes of state responsibility has more often been invoked and resorted to in investment arbitration in the context of the relationship between BIT non-precluded measures (NPM) clauses and the customary necessity defence as a secondary norm enshrined in Article 25 of the ILC Responsibility Articles. More specifically, and in the context of the numerous investment protection disputes generated by the Argentinean economic crisis, the issue of necessity has been perhaps the most controversial issue, having been given conflicting treatment by different investment arbitration tribunals. 172 Importantly, the ICSID Annulment Ad Hoc Committee in CMS v. Argentina, made substantial use of the primary/secondary norm distinction. A substantial aspect of the dispute focused on state of necessity as a defence provided by both the BIT and customary law. The CMS Tribunal had in the first place dealt with Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT (a NPM clause) 173 as lex specialis allegedly identical to the customary law necessity defence. 174 This view was severely criticized at the annulment stage. The Ad Hoc Committee found that the CMS Tribunal had erred in law because it had treated Article XI of the BIT and necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under customary law as one and the same defence; in other words, because it did not take into account the primary/secondary norm-type differentiation in its analysis. 175 Necessity as a secondary norm and a circumstance precluding wrongfulness may justify an act which has already been qualified as wrongful, 176 and 'is not intended to cover conduct which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations'. 177 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness were treated in the ILC Articles 'as secondary rules of a general character, and not as a presumptive part of every primary rule'. 178 Conversely, non-precluded measures clauses, such as Article XI of the BIT, or Article XX GATT 1995, 179 rather constitute primary norms which, if operative, lead to the acknowledgement of 'no breach' as the juridical result. Secondary norms are dependent upon the prior breach of primary ones; 180 primary and secondary norms do not purport to regulate the same subject-matter. 181 Consequently, the customary necessity defence under Article 25 becomes pertinent only after the requirements of non-precluded measures clauses have not been fulfilled and have resulted in the prior (in resorting to the secondary norm) acknowledgement of the breach which is sought to be justified. 182 Moreover, while the necessity defence in Article 25 is formulated in negative language prescribing what can in exceptional cases be illegal but still justified, 183 in contrast NPM clauses positively prescribe what is in any event legal. 184 In this respect, and due to the different context and operation, it is not possible to consider these NPM clauses as lex specialis vis-à-vis the general international law necessity defence; for, NPM provisions in fact constitute primary norms proper and thus cannot, and should not, be regarded as 'special' vis-à-vis contextually similar secondary norms of a customary nature. As a result, and notwithstanding the existence of NPM clauses in the regulatory ambit of treaty-established specialized regimes, secondary norms on state responsibility derived from general (that is, erga omnes binding) international law can be still independently invoked as applicable defences in adjudication taking place in the realm of the various international regimes. 185 While the CMS stance towards the primary/secondary distinction has also been followed, albeit partly confusingly, in Continental Casualty Co v. Argentina, 186 it was only very shortly before the time of writing of this study that the above propositions on the preponderant role of the primary/secondary norm distinction for the operation of lex specialis were fully verified by the ICSID Ad hoc Committee which annulled the previously rendered Award of the Sempra Tribunal for manifest excess of powers on the basis of failure to apply the applicable law, namely Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT. 187 The Sempra Ad hoc Committee, in mid-2010, approvingly referred to the findings of the CMS Ad hoc Committee and reiterated the importance of drawing the primary/ secondary norm distinction for the purposes of proper analytical legal reasoning in international adjudication: essentially, it is exactly because the customary necessity defence in Article 25 of the ILC Responsibility Articles and Article XI of the BIT in question (as an NPM clause) 'deal with quite different situations' (i.e., display different normative function) that the application of the former does not take place in the context of interpreting the latter as lex specialis, 188 but, rather, both apply in a parallel and independent fashion. 189 Nor should the view expressed by the Renta Tribunal, according to which the distinction between primary and secondary norms is allegedly nonnormative, 190 be considered as undermining the propositions expressed by the CMS and Sempra Ad hoc Committees. What must be noted is that the impetus underlying the Renta Tribunal's remark was rather to be found in its subsequent statement that the application of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause is not limited to primary obligations. 191 It appears then that its stance on the primary/secondary distinction was rather premised on the misconception of secondary rules as allegedly 'procedural' norms, i.e., not creating rights or obligations; but again, the Tribunal possibly omitted to take into account Crawford's important observation that the obligations in the ILC Articles associated with cessation, reparation, and countermeasures 'are themselves international obligations of the State concerned, and the draft articles, which apply to all international obligations of States, are thus reflexive'. 192 In this sense, and for the purposes of application of MFN in casu, the distinction per se actually posed no obstacles, so that the remark made in passim on the utility of the primary/secondary norm distinction, already analysed in detail in this study, should be treated as of limited, if any, analytical impact. Hence, and unlike those who view the primary/secondary norm distinction as of limited pertinence to the fragmentation discourse, 193 the primary/secondary norm distinction in fact plays a crucial normative role in the international legal argument as closely interlinked with the operation of the lex specialis principle. For, it becomes apparent that a primary norm cannot prevail
